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   This essay examines what, if anything, differentiates Enron’s questionable use of 
off-balance-sheet special purposes entities, or SPEs, from the trillions of dollars of supposedly 
“legitimate” securitization and other structured finance transactions that use SPEs.  The 
inquiry is important because the absence of meaningful differences would call all these 
transactions into question, whereas the presence of meaningful differences may inform 
regulatory schemes by providing a basis to distinguish which structured finance transactions 
should be allowed.  This Essay also introduces the dilemma that some structured finance 
transactions are so complex that disclosure to investors in the sponsoring company is 
necessarily imperfect—either oversimplifying the transactions or providing detail and 
sophistication beyond the level of most investors.  The Essay argues that the company’s 
investors must rely, to some extent, on the business judgment of management in setting up 
these structures for the company’s benefit. 